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PLAIN PACKAGING OF CIGARETTES UNDER EU LAW 
 
Alberto Alemanno and Enrico Bonadio 
 
[FolloǁiŶg Australia͛s ŵoǀe toǁards ŵaŶdatory plaiŶ paĐkagiŶg of Đigarettes, the EuropeaŶ UŶioŶ is 
also considering a similar tobacco control policy pending the ongoing revision of its Tobacco Products 
Directive. This chapter provides a detailed examination of the legality of plain packaging of cigarettes 
under EU law by exploring how such a policy might fare in the EU political and legal context. Although 
the analysis predominantly focuses on the adoption of an EU-wide plain packaging scheme, it also 
discusses the legal implications stemming from the more likely adoption of similar schemes at the 
national level. In the absence of a draft proposal by the EU Commission, which is expected no earlier 
than June 2012, the analysis takes as a point of reference the proposed scheme of plain packaging 
recently adopted in Australia. In particular, the analysis focuses on the legal basis on which the EU 
could enact plain packaging as well as on its compatibility with the proportionality principle, the EU 
trademark regime and fundamental rights.] 
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I   Introduction 
Despite its increased public rejection, smoking is the single largest cause of preventable death and 
disease iŶ the EuƌopeaŶ UŶioŶ ;͚EU͛Ϳ, aĐĐouŶtiŶg foƌ ϲϱϬ,ϬϬϬ deaths. In addition, over 13 million 
people in the 27 countries of the EU suffer from smoking-related diseases. For more than a decade, 
however, the prevalence of smoking has been on the decline,1 reflecting a broader trend among 
industrialised countries that may be observed since the 1980s. 
 
The EU has been actively contributing to a reduction of tobacco consumption during the last three 
decades, by acting at national, regional and international levels. However, unlike other jurisdictions 
engaged in tobacco control policies, the EU is not a nation-state and as such it has limited 
competence in public health matters.2 In particular, EU tobacco policy has historically been based on 
the competence to establish and regulate the European internal market. Although pursuing a public 
health goal by promoting — rather than restricting — the free movement of cigarettes in Europe 
might appear paradoxical, this is the legal logic dominating the EU regulatory approach to tobacco. 
 
In spite of these limitations, the EU has been one of the most active players in tobacco control 
policies across the world and, as such, played a significant role in the process that led to the 
ĐoŶĐlusioŶ of the Woƌld Health OƌgaŶizatioŶ ;͚WHO͛Ϳ Framework Convention on Tobacco Control3 
(͚WHO FCTC͛). It is therefore no surprise that the EU, striving to go beyond the minimum 
requirements of the WHO FCTC,4 is currently engaged in strengthening and modernising its tobacco 
control policy, which is based on a mix of policy measures to curb smoking and proteĐt ĐitizeŶs͛ 
health. These measures include pricing and tax policies, smoking bans in workplaces and public 
places, bans on advertising of tobacco products, targeted consumer information, warning labels and 
treatment for smokers who want to quit. In particular, EU efforts focused on the revision of the 2001 
Tobacco Products Directive,5 which introduced pioneering tobacco control measures such as a ban 
on misleading descriptors (eg ͚ŵild͛, ͚light͛ oƌ ͚loǁ taƌ͛Ϳ. This Directive also reinforced several pre-
existing pack space appropriation measures by increasing the size of text health warnings and 
estaďlished ŵaǆiŵuŵ taƌ, ŶiĐotiŶe aŶd ĐaƌďoŶ ŵoŶoǆide leǀels ;ĐoŵŵoŶlǇ ƌefeƌƌed to as ͚TNCO 
ĐeiliŶgs͛Ϳ foƌ Đigaƌettes. Besides ďƌoadeŶiŶg the sĐope of the DiƌeĐtive, for example by including 
electronic cigarettes, herbal cigarettes, water pipes and other paraphernalia, the revision 
contemplates the introduction of new policy tools such as plain packaging of cigarettes and bans on 
cigarette vending machines and tobacco displays at points-of-sale. 
 
This chapter examines the legality of mandatory plain packaging of cigarettes under EU law. Although 
the analysis predominantly focuses on the adoption of an EU-wide plain packaging scheme, within 
the framework of the revision of the Tobacco Products Directive, it also discusses the legal 
implications of similar mechanisms at the national level. This seems all the more justified given the 
                                                          
1
 The smoking prevalence remains high compared to other industrialised countries with an average of around 
29%. Southern European countries have the greatest proportions of smokers — particularly Greece, where the 
proportion of smokers exceeds 40% — while the Northern countries of Sweden and Finland have the lowest 
proportions at 16% and 21% respectively. See: Euƌoďaƌoŵeteƌ “uƌǀeǇ, ͚ToďaĐĐo “uŵŵaƌǇ͛, “peĐial 
Eurobarometer 332/Wave 72.3 (May 2010).  
2
 Article 168(5) of the TFEU expressly excludes harmonising measures in this area: see Article 168(5). 
3
 2302 UNTS 166 (adopted 21 May 2003, entered into force 27 February 2005). The WHO FCTC is the first 
international treaty negotiated under the auspices of WHO and currently has 174 members. 
4
 Article 2(1) of the WHO FCTC (Relationship between this Convention and other agreements and legal 
instruments). 
5
 Directive 2001/37 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2001 on the Approximation of the 
Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions of the Member States Concerning the Manufacture, 
Presentation and Sale of Tobacco Products [2001] OJ L 194/26. 
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ongoing debates in several EU Member States, such as Belgium,6 France7 and the United Kingdom,8 
over whether to introduce plain packaging in their own legal orders. In other words, should an EU-
wide plain packaging scheme eventually not emerge within the framework of the revision of the 
Tobacco Products Directive, it is likely that plain packaging will be adopted by some EU Member 
States under the influence of the precedent to be set by Australia.9 In the absence of a draft proposal 
by the EuƌopeaŶ CoŵŵissioŶ ;͚CoŵŵissioŶ͛Ϳ, ǁhiĐh is Ŷot eǆpeĐted eaƌlieƌ thaŶ JuŶe ϮϬϭϮ, the 
analysis will take as a point of reference the sort of scheme for plain packaging of cigarettes currently 
under consideration by the Australian Parliament.10  
 
Section II, after introducing the reader to the main features of the EU Tobacco Products Directive, 
identifies the main legal implications of the introduction of cigarette plain packaging at the EU level. 
Section III focuses on the controversial issue of the EU legal basis for adopting a harmonised measure 
inspired by a public health objective. Section IV examines plain packaging in the light of the 
proportionality principle. Section V explores the inherent tension between plain packaging and 
trademark rights within the EU internal market. Section VI reviews plain packaging on the basis of the 
fundamental rights afforded by the EU legal order, notably the right of property. And finally, section 
VII explores possible scenarios that could arise should plain packaging be adopted at the national 
level instead of at the EU level, before formulating some final conclusions.  
 
II   The Legal Implications of Plain Packaging under EU Law  
The Tobacco Products Directive dates from 2001. By recasting two previous directives dealing with 
labeling and maximum tar yields, this legislation became, together with the Tobacco Advertising 
Directive, the primary tool developed by the EU to regulate tobacco products and their entrance into 
the ŵaƌket. Hoǁeǀeƌ, ͚Ŷeǁ iŶteƌŶatioŶal, sĐieŶtifiĐ aŶd ŵaƌket deǀelopŵeŶts ƌeƋuiƌe ƌefleĐtiŶg 
ǁhetheƌ the DiƌeĐtiǀe still fullǇ guaƌaŶtees͛ its oƌigiŶal oďjectives: facilitating the functioning of the 
internal market in tobacco products while ensuring a high level of health protection. This is the 
declared rationale behind the proposed revision of the Tobacco Products Directive from a Public 
Consultation Document published by the Commission in 2010.11  
 
A   Public Consultation Document on the Possible Revision of the Tobacco Products Directive 
The Public Consultation Document contemplates for the first time the introduction of plain packaging 
as one of the policy options that the EU legislature might consider while updating the Tobacco 
Products Directive. 
 
Plain packaging would complement the labeling requirements already contained in Article 5 of the 
Directive. That provision currently mandates that packages of manufactured cigarettes display the 
results of the commonly measured TNCO yields from tobacco smoke and that all packages carry 
textual warnings. It also allows Member States to go beyond these requirements and introduces, on 
a voluntary basis, pictorial warnings to be chosen from an EU-wide library of colour photographs. 
 
In particular, plain packaging is contemplated as one of the policy options available to the EU 
legislatuƌe ǁheŶ addƌessiŶg the ͚ĐoŶsuŵeƌ iŶfoƌŵatioŶ' poliĐǇ pƌoďleŵ as ideŶtified ďǇ the 
                                                          
6
 OŶ ϭ9 JaŶuaƌǇ ϮϬϭϬ, Belgiuŵ͛s Health MiŶisteƌ, iŶ ƌespoŶse to a ƋuestioŶ iŶ the Belgiuŵ PaƌliaŵeŶt, 
expressed support for plain packaging, including at European Union level. 
7
 “ee ͚PƌopositioŶ de Loi VisaŶt à l͛IŶstauƌatioŶ d͛uŶ PaƋuet de Cigaƌettes Neutƌe et “taŶdaƌdisé͛.  
8
 See United Kingdom, Healthy Lives, Healthy People: A Tobacco Control Plan for England, CM 7985 (30 
November 2010) [3.25]. 
9
 See Tobacco Plain Packaging Bill 2011 (Cth). 
10
 See Tobacco Plain Packaging Bill 2011(Cth), in particular cl 14(2). 
11
 European Commission, Health and Consumer Protection Directorate-General, Public Consultation Document 
on the Possible Revision of the Tobacco Products Directive 2001/37/EC (2010). 
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Commission in its consultation document. Behind this problem lie three different issues that, 
according to the Commission, might effectively be addressed by plain packaging. First, this policy tool 
might help overcome the existing disparities in labeling due to the voluntary pictorial warnings 
regime, which led some Member States, but not all, to make pictorial warnings mandatory in their 
own jurisdictions. Second, plain packaging would enable the EU legislature to regulate packaging as 
an advertising tool, a ĐƌuĐial utilisatioŶ siŶĐe ͚toďaĐĐo paĐkagiŶg aŶd pƌoduĐt featuƌes aƌe 
iŶĐƌeasiŶglǇ used to attƌaĐt ĐoŶsuŵeƌs aŶd to pƌoŵote pƌoduĐts aŶd ďƌaŶd iŵage.͛12 Third, plain 
packaging could improve consumer information by preventing the existing TNCO quantitative 
laďeliŶg fƌoŵ ďeiŶg ŵisƌead ďǇ ĐoŶsuŵeƌs ǁho ŵight ͚thiŶk that loǁeƌ leǀels iŶdiĐate that a pƌoduĐt 
is less ƌiskǇ to theiƌ health͛ aŶd thus ͚deĐide to sŵoke oƌ iŶĐƌease theiƌ ĐoŶsuŵptioŶ…iŶ pƌefeƌeŶĐe 
to ƋuittiŶg.͛13 Although it is too early, lacking a Commission proposal, to ascribe the abovementioned 
objectives to an EU-wide plain packaging scheme, one can clearly identify two well-defined policy 
roles that this tool might play within the EU. First, by overcoming existing regulatory divergence 
among tobacco products, it may act as an internal market-enhancer. Second, by detracting attention 
from the packages and preventing them from being used to suggest that some products are less 
harmful than others, it may also serve as an anti-misleading marketing tool.  
 
B   The Definition of Plain Packaging 
The definition of plain packaging discussed by the EU Commission in its consultation document14 is in 
line with that provided by the Guidelines for implementation of Article 11 (Packaging and labeling of 
Tobacco Products) and Article 13 (Tobacco advertising, promotion and sponsorship) of the WHO 
FCTC,15 which has inspired the Australian Tobacco Plain Packaging Bill 2011 (Cth).16  
 
It is against this backdrop that this chapter provides a detailed analysis of plain packaging of 
cigarettes in the light of EU treaty provisions and existing EU legislation as well as the relevant case 
law.  
 
III   Legal Basis for EU-Wide Plain Packaging 
A Background 
According to the principle of conferral, the EU is not endowed with a general law-making power. As a 
result, it is necessary to search through the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union ;͚TFEU͛Ϳ 
to identify a provision enabling the EU to adopt legislation in any given policy area17. To date, actual 
and potential legal bases for tobacco control policies include Article 38 (agriculture), Article 113 
(taxation), Article 114 (internal market), Article 207 (commercial policy), Article 153 (woƌkeƌ͛s 
protection), Article 168 (public health) and Article 169 (consumer protection). 
 
Currently, virtually all existing legislation on labeling, advertising and product regulation has been 
enacted based on the internal market basis provided for in Article 114. This is the most important 
TFEU provision relating to harmonisation: it empowers the EU to replace, by qualified majority vote, 
divergent national legislation with a common rule applicable across the whole territory. Although the 
protection of public health is one of the basic requirements that the EU must take into account in the 
enactment of any of its policies or activities,18 Member States remain generally competent to adopt 
                                                          
12
 Ibid 6. 
13
 Ibid 7. 
14
 Ibid. 
15
 Guidelines for implementation of Article 11 WHO FCTC, para 46 and Guidelines for implementation of Article 
13 WHO FCTC, para 16. 
16
 Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, House of Representatives, Tobacco Plain Packaging Bill 2011: 
Explanatory Memorandum (6 July 2011) 2. 
17
 Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union OJ C 115, 9.5.2008, p. 1.  
18
 TFEU Article 9. 
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their own public health measures. This is because Article 168 of the TFEU — similarly to its 
predecessor, Article 152 of the Treaty of the European Community (TEC)19 — explicitly excludes the 
possibility of the EU harmonising the laws and regulations of Member States under that provision. 
Yet following the entry into force of the LisďoŶ TƌeatǇ ;͚LisďoŶ TƌeatǇ͛Ϳ20, Article 168 adds two kinds 
of measures to the list of actions that could already be adopted in the past by the EU: 
  
- iŶ paƌagƌaph ϰ;ĐͿ: ͚ŵeasuƌes settiŶg high staŶdaƌds of ƋualitǇ aŶd safetǇ foƌ ŵediĐiŶal 
products and deǀiĐes foƌ ŵediĐal use͛; 
 
- iŶ paƌagƌaph ϱ: ͚iŶĐeŶtiǀe ŵeasuƌes desigŶed to pƌoteĐt aŶd iŵpƌoǀe huŵaŶ health …aŶd 
measures which have as their direct objective the protection of public health regarding 
tobacco and the abuse of alcohol, excluding any harmonization of the laws and regulations of 
the Member States͛.21 
 
Although this is the first express reference to tobacco control measures to appear in the TFEU, it falls 
short of providing a new legal basis for the adoption of EU-wide measures such as plain packaging. 
Indeed, despite the implicit recognition that tobacco is detrimental to human health, the same 
provision expressly excludes the adoption of harmonized rules aimed at combating tobacco 
consumption. As a result, in the absence of any extension of the EU͛s poǁeƌs folloǁiŶg the eŶtƌǇ iŶto 
force of the Lisbon Treaty, the scope of competence of the EU in the field of public health remains, 
on the whole, largely unchanged.22  
 
This brief excursus into the complex world of EU competencies in regulating tobacco reveals that a 
legal basis for the introduction of plain packaging seems more likely to be found in TFEU Article 114 
(internal market) than in TFEU Article 168 (public health).  
 
Unlike many other legal bases provided for in the TFEU, Article 114 is not sector-specific and is rather 
driven by the functional concern to establish an internal market.23 It is now settled that to rely on 
Article 114 as the basis for the adoption of a harmonised measure: 
 
1. Theƌe ŵust eǆist aŶ ͚iŶteƌŶal ŵaƌket ďaƌƌieƌ͛ ƌesulting from disparities in the measures of 
Member States; 
 
2. This ŵaƌket ďaƌƌieƌ ŵust Ŷot ĐoŶsist of aŶ ͚aďstƌaĐt ƌisk of oďstaĐles͛, ďut ŵust ͚oďstƌuĐt the 
fuŶdaŵeŶtal fƌeedoŵs͛ oƌ Đause ͚distoƌtioŶs of ĐoŵpetitioŶ͛ ǁithiŶ the iŶteƌŶal ŵaƌket; 
 
3. The iŶteŶded haƌŵoŶisatioŶ should ͚geŶuiŶelǇ haǀe as its oďjeĐt the iŵpƌoǀeŵeŶt of the 
ĐoŶditioŶs foƌ the estaďlishŵeŶt aŶd fuŶĐtioŶiŶg of the iŶteƌŶal ŵaƌket͛.24 
                                                          
19
 Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and of the Treaty establishing the European 
Community OJ C 321E, 29.12.2006, p. 1. 
20
 TREATY OF LISBON AMENDING THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION AND THE TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, 
Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1 [hereinafter Lisbon Treaty]. As a result of the Lisbon Treaty, which entered 
into force on December 1, 2009, the distinction between the EC and EU has disappeared. The EC no longer 
exists under this name but is integrated within the European Union, which is now given explicit legal 
personality. TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191). 
21
 Emphasis added. 
22
 See, eg, Paul Craig, The Lisbon Treaty: Law, Politics and Treaty Reform (Oxford University Press, 2010) 325; 
Jean-Claude Piris, The Lisbon Treaty: A Legal and Political Analysis (Cambridge University Press, 2010) 320-321. 
23
 TFEU Article 26(2). 
24
 See lastly The Queen, on the application of Vodafone Ltd and Others v Secretary of State for Business, 
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (Court of Justice of the European Union, C-58/08, 8 June 2010) [32]. 
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B   Existence of an Internal Market Barrier  
Before ascertaining the existence of obstacles to trade warranting the introduction of plain 
packaging, one should recall that the European Court of Justice upheld the Tobacco Products 
DiƌeĐtiǀe ďeĐause it fouŶd that dispaƌities eǆisted ďetǁeeŶ Meŵďeƌ “tates͛ laǁs, ƌegulatioŶs aŶd 
administrative provisions on the presentation of tobacco products.25 Therefore, in the framework of 
a revision of the Tobacco Products Directive, the question is whether obstacles still remain, or 
whether new ones have emerged, in the trade in tobacco products so as to justify the introduction of 
plain packaging.  
 
As of today, virtually all features relating to tobacco packaging are harmonised under the Tobacco 
Products Directive. Therefore, the possibility of disparities in labeling across the EU would seem very 
limited. As suggested by the European Commission, the main, if not exclusive, source of 
discrepancies in product presentation seems to be pictorial warnings. As use of such warnings is 
voluntary at the EU level, some Member States have made them compulsory while others have not, 
thus leading to a disparity in labeling throughout the EU.  
 
Would the existence of this obstacle alone justify the introduction of plain packaging in the EU 
internal market? The European Commission seems to believe so, despite the fact that the Tobacco 
Products Directive already addressed the potential disparities stemming from the voluntary 
character of picture-based warnings by introducing a common set of colour photographs. 26 
Nevertheless, the European Commission suggests in its consultation document that the introduction 
of plain packaging of cigarettes could help to overcome this problem by enabling manufacturers 
currently affected by national mandatory graphic warnings to no longer comply with differing 
legislation. Yet it is doubtful whether the EU could defend the introduction of plain packaging as 
addressing this obstacle to the trade in tobacco products within the EU, for at least two reasons. 
First, it is self-evident that mandating pictorial warnings across the EU rather than introducing plain 
packaging would be a most immediate way to achieve the declared objective of removing this 
remaining disparity on the packages of cigarettes. Secondly, given the uncertainty regarding the 
exact relationship between plain packaging and pictorial warnings (should they be complementary or 
mutually exclusive?),27 it remains unclear to what extent the introduction of plain packaging would 
remove the labeling disparities stemming from the voluntary character of pictorial warnings across 
the EU. The Australian scheme, as well as the majority of studies supporting plain packaging, suggest 
that standardised packs and mandatory graphic warnings go together.28 
 
C   Existence of a Genuine Barrier to Trade 
The only real obstacle to trade that an EU-wide plain packaging measure might remedy is legislative 
disparities that could potentially emerge from the introduction of national legislation mandating 
plain packaging. If the United Kingdom, France or Belgium introduced mandatory plain packaging of 
cigarettes, this would Đƌeate aŶ oďstaĐle to tƌade ͚suĐh as to oďstƌuĐt the fuŶdaŵeŶtal fƌeedoŵs aŶd 
thus haǀe a diƌeĐt effeĐt oŶ the fuŶĐtioŶiŶg of the iŶteƌŶal ŵaƌket.͛29 In these circumstances, the 
                                                          
25
 The Queen v Secretary of State for Health, ex parte British American Tobacco (Investments) Ltd and Imperial 
Tobacco Ltd (C-491/01) [2002] ECR I-11453, [65]. 
26
 See in particular Article 5(3) of the Tobacco Products Directive as well as Decision 2003/641 On the Use of 
Color Photographs and Other Illustrations as Health Warnings on Tobacco Packages [2003] OJ L 226/24. 
27
 According to the toďaĐĐo ĐoŶtƌol ĐoŵŵuŶitǇ, ͚plaiŶ paĐkagiŶg ĐaŶŶot ďe dissoĐiated fƌoŵ ŵaŶdatoƌǇ 
piĐtoƌial ǁaƌŶiŶgs͛: Comments from the Tobacco Control Community on the RAND Report (2010) 9. 
Nevertheless, the Commission discusses the two policy options separately in its stakeholder consultation 
paper.  
28
 Tobacco Plain Packaging Bill 2011. 
29
 Germany v European Parliament and Council of the European Union (Tobacco Advertising II) (C-380/03) 
[2006] ECR I-11573, [37]. 
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second condition for reliance on Article 114 of the TFEU could be satisfied. Absent national 
legislation mandating plain packaging in at least one EU country, this barrier is merely speculative. 
However, contrary to what one might expect, this is not an insurmountable problem to the adoption 
of plain packaging. A prospective obstacle to trade could still justify reliance on Article 114 if: 
 
1. The eŵeƌgeŶĐe of suĐh oďstaĐles is ͚likelǇ͛; aŶd 
 
2. The ŵeasuƌe iŶ ƋuestioŶ is ͚desigŶed to pƌeǀeŶt theŵ͛.30  
 
It follows that should the European Commission be able to prove that obstacles to the free 
movement of tobacco products could arise as a result of the adoption of national plain packaging 
schemes, it would be able to validly rely on Article 114 to introduce plain packaging at the EU level 
despite the absence of actual obstacles to trade. It is therefore conceivable that a competence to 
harmonise that did not exist in the past may come into being where public pressure for national 
regulation is strong.31 In upholding the Tobacco Products Directive, the European Court of Justice 
also stated that ͚pƌogƌess iŶ sĐieŶtifiĐ kŶoǁledge is Ŷot… the oŶlǇ gƌouŶd oŶ ǁhiĐh the EU legislatuƌe 
can decide to adapt EU legislation since it must, in exercising its discretion in this area, also take into 
account other considerations, such as the increased importance given to the social and political 
aspects of the anti-smoking campaign.͛32 
 
D   Intended Harmonisation Should Improve the Internal Market 
To be validly adopted, an EU-wide plaiŶ paĐkagiŶg sĐheŵe should also ͚geŶuiŶelǇ haǀe as its oďjeĐt 
the iŵpƌoǀeŵeŶt of the ĐoŶditioŶs foƌ the estaďlishŵeŶt aŶd fuŶĐtioŶiŶg of the iŶteƌŶal ŵaƌket.͛33 
Under settled case law, if a mere finding of disparities between national rules, or an abstract risk of 
obstacles to the exercise of the fundamental freedoms or of distortions of competition, were 
sufficient to justify reliance upon Article 114, judicial review of compliance with the conditions 
underpinning that legal basis might be rendered nugatory.34 To avoid this, measures adopted under 
Article 114 must actually contribute to the elimination of obstacles to free movement, or remove 
appreciable distortions of competition within the internal market. 
 
This requirement imposes a check on proposed harmonisation measures that prevents them from 
circumventing the legal basis requirement. In this respect, it seems undisputed that a general rule 
mandating standardised packaging for the marketing of cigarettes in Europe would effectively 
remove any such obstacles. However, such a measure would also clearly pursue another objective: 
the protection of public health. 
 
                                                          
30
 See Germany v European Parliament and Council of the European Union (Tobacco Advertising II) (C-380/03) 
[2006] ECR I-11573, [38]. 
31
 See also Swedish Match AB and Swedish Match UK Ltd v Secretary of State for Health (C-210/03) [2004] ECR 
I-11893, [38]. 
32
 The Queen v Secretary of State for Health, ex parte British American Tobacco (Investments) Ltd and Imperial 
Tobacco Ltd (C-491/01) [2002] ECR I-11453, [80]. 
33
 Federal Republic of Germany v European Parliament and Council of the European Union (C-376/98) [2000]  
ECR I-08419, [84]; The Queen v Secretary of State for Health, ex parte British American Tobacco (Investments) 
Ltd and Imperial Tobacco Ltd (C-491/01) [2002] ECR I-11453, [60]; Germany v European Parliament and Council 
of the European Union (Tobacco Advertising II) (C-380/03) [2006] ECR I-11573, [37]. 
34
 Federal Republic of Germany v European Parliament and Council of the European Union (C-376/98) [2000]  
ECR I-08419, [84]; Germany v European Parliament and Council of the European Union (Tobacco Advertising II)  
(C-380/03) [2006] ECR I-11573, [37]; Arnold André GmbH & Co KG v Landrat des Kreises Herford (C-434/02) 
[2004] ECR I‑ 11825, [30]; Swedish Match AB and Swedish Match UK Ltd v Secretary of State for Health (C-
210/03) [2004] ECR I-11893, [29]; The Queen, on the Application of Alliance for Natural Health and Others v 
Secretary of State for Health and National Assembly for Wales (C-154/04 and C-155/04) [2005] ECR I-6451, [28]. 
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It is settled case law that, provided that the legal conditions for recourse to Article 114 are fulfilled, 
͚the EU legislatuƌe ĐaŶŶot ďe pƌeǀeŶted fƌoŵ ƌelǇiŶg oŶ that legal ďasis oŶ the gƌouŶd that puďliĐ 
health pƌoteĐtioŶ is a deĐisiǀe faĐtoƌ iŶ the ĐhoiĐes to ďe ŵade.͛35 This is supported by the first 
subparagraph of Article 168, which provides that a ͚high leǀel of huŵaŶ health pƌoteĐtioŶ͛ is to ďe 
ensured in the implementation of all EU policies and activities. In sum, while Article 168 excludes any 
harmonisation of laws and regulations of Member States that is designed to protect human health, 
that pƌoǀisioŶ does Ŷot ŵeaŶ ͚that haƌŵoŶisiŶg ŵeasuƌes adopted oŶ the ďasis of otheƌ pƌoǀisioŶs 
of the TƌeatǇ ĐaŶŶot haǀe aŶǇ iŵpaĐt oŶ the pƌoteĐtioŶ of huŵaŶ health.͛36 
 
E   Conclusion on Legal Basis 
Our analysis identifies the legal conditions under which plain packaging of cigarettes could be validly 
introduced in the EU legal order by relying on the internal market legal basis. The European 
CoŵŵissioŶ, ďeiŶg eǆpliĐitlǇ ďouŶd to uphold ͚a high leǀel of huŵaŶ health pƌoteĐtioŶ͛, Đould 
propose the enactment of an EU-wide plain packaging scheme even in the absence of an actual 
barrier to trade. This is because, given the increasing consideration of plain packaging schemes by 
the legislatures of Member States, there seems to be more than an abstract risk of obstacles arising 
in the near future.  
 
IV   Proportionality 
Plain packaging, like any other policy option proposed by the European Commission and adopted by 
the EU legislature, is subject not only to the principle of conferral but also to the principle of 
proportionality. Under this principle, the content and form of EU action must not exceed what is 
necessary to achieve the objectives of the TFEU. According to established case law, an EU act is 
proportionate when it is suitable and necessary to achieve its declared goal.37 In particular, the 
principle of proportionality requires: 
 
1. That measures adopted by EU institutions should not exceed the limits of what is suitable 
or appropriate in order to attain the legitimate objective pursued by the legislation in 
question (suitability limb); 
 
2. Where there is a choice between several appropriate measures recourse must be had to 
the least onerous method (necessity limb); and 
  
3. That the disadvantages caused must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued 
(proportionality stricto sensu).38 
 
A   The Declared Objective(s) of Plain Packaging 
For the reasons mentioned above, it is likely that plain packaging, similar to all tobacco control tools 
adopted in the past, would be presented as pursuing an internal market objective.  At the same time, 
given the undisputable public health character of the standardised pack, the EU measure, in 
accordance with Article 114(3) of the TFEU, would also encompass a high level of human health 
protection. Research shows that packaging of tobacco products is an important element of 
                                                          
35
 Federal Republic of Germany v European Parliament and Council of the European Union (C-376/98) [2000]  
ECR I-08419, [88]; Germany v European Parliament and Council of the European Union (Tobacco Advertising II)  
(C-380/03) [2006] ECR I-11573, [39], [92]. 
36
 Germany v European Parliament and Council of the European Union (Tobacco Advertising II) (C-380/03) 
[2006] ECR I-11573, [95]. 
37
 See, eg, Internationale Handeslgesellschaft mbH v Einfhur- un Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel (C-
11/70) [1970] ECR 1125. 
38
 Pfizer Animal Health v Council (T-13/99) [2002] ECR II-3305, [411]. 
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advertising and promotion.39 In particular, it suggests that removing the colour, brand imagery and 
logos from packaging not only reduces its attractiveness but also enhances the ability to 
communicate health warning to the consumer.40 However, given the rather polarised scientific 
debate over its effectiveness in reducing tobacco-related morbidity and mortality,41 the impact of 
plain packaging on smoking behavior is not easily defined with precision.42 According to the 
Guidelines on Article 11 and Article 13 of the WHO FCTC,43 plain packaging may reduce the 
prevalence of tobacco use so as to protect present and future generations from the adverse 
consequences of tobacco consumption in the three ways: by increasiŶg ͚the ŶotiĐeaďilitǇ aŶd 
effeĐtiǀeŶess of health ǁaƌŶiŶgs aŶd ŵessages͛; ďǇ pƌeǀeŶtiŶg ͚the paĐkage fƌoŵ detƌaĐtiŶg 
atteŶtioŶ fƌoŵ theŵ͛; aŶd ďǇ addƌessiŶg ͚iŶdustƌǇ paĐkage desigŶ teĐhŶiƋues that ŵaǇ suggest that 
some products are less harmful than otheƌs͛ aŶd that ͚attƌaĐt ĐoŶsuŵeƌs, pƌoŵote pƌoduĐts aŶd 
Đultiǀate ďƌaŶd ideŶtitǇ͛.  
 
Therefore, depending on the exact formulation of the declared public health objectives selected by 
the EU Commission when proposing a EU-wide plain packaging scheme, the outcome of the 
proportionality test might differ. For the purposes of our analysis, we assume that the declared goal 
of the measure will be the free movement objective combined with the aim to ensure a high level of 
health protection. 
 
Once the objectives pursued are identified, it is necessary to determine whether plain packaging of 
cigarettes exceeds the limits of what is appropriate (suitability limb) and necessary (necessity limb) 
to achieve those objectives.44  
 
B   The Proportionality Inquiry 
1   Suitability  
Under the first limb of the proportionality test, the European Court of Justice inquires first whether 
the adopted measure is suitable or appropriate to achieve the desired end. Therefore, the question 
to be determined in applying the suitability test is whether plain packaging has any benefits at all for 
the harmonisation of national laws on plain packaging that are likely to arise and for achieving a high 
level of human health protection. It seems quite easy to prove that an EU-wide scheme would 
overcome emerging disparities among national labeling schemes. It is more problematic to prove the 
                                                          
39
 See, eg, David HaŵŵoŶd et al, ͚Cigaƌette PaĐk DesigŶ aŶd PeƌĐeptioŶs of ‘isk AŵoŶg UK Adults aŶd Youth͛, 
(2009) 19 European Journal of Public Health ϲϯϭ aŶd Cƌaǁfoƌd Moodie & Geƌaƌd B HastiŶgs, ͚MakiŶg the PaĐk 
the Hero, Tobacco Industry Response to Marketing Restrictions in the UK: Findings from a Long-Teƌŵ Audit͛ 
(2009) 9 International Journal of Mental Health and Addiction 24. 
40
 Sambrook Research Institute, A Review of the Science Base to Support the Development of Health Warnings 
for Tobacco Packages (prepared for European Commission, Directorate General for Health and Consumers, 18 
May 2009) 147-48. 
41
 A significant number of reports, mainly commissioned by the tobacco industry, has recently been published 
with the declared goal of assessing the existing literature. These documents typically highlight the 
methodological limits and flaws of the existing studies. See, eg, Jorge Padilla and Nadine Watson, A Critical 
Review of the Literature on Generic Packaging for Cigarettes (prepared for Philip Morris International, 4 
January 2010); Berenberg Bank, Global Tobacco – The Plain Risk to Global Tobacco (21 March 2011) ; Deloitte, 
Tobacco Plain Packaging Regulation: An International Assessment of the Intended and Unintended Impacts 
(Prepared for British American Tobacco, May 2011). 
42
 United Kingdom Deptartment of Health, A Smokefree Future: A Comprehensive Tobacco Control Strategy for 
England (1 February 2010) 3.25. 
43
 WHO Fƌaŵeǁoƌk CoŶǀeŶtioŶ oŶ ToďaĐĐo CoŶtƌol CoŶfeƌeŶĐe of the Paƌties, ͚GuideliŶes foƌ IŵpleŵeŶtatioŶ 
of Article 11 of the WHO Framework ConveŶtioŶ oŶ ToďaĐĐo CoŶtƌol͛, FCTC/COP3(10) (22 November 2008); 
WHO Fƌaŵeǁoƌk CoŶǀeŶtioŶ oŶ ToďaĐĐo CoŶtƌol CoŶfeƌeŶĐe of the Paƌties, ͚GuideliŶes foƌ IŵpleŵeŶtatioŶ of 
AƌtiĐle ϭϯ of the WHO Fƌaŵeǁoƌk CoŶǀeŶtioŶ oŶ ToďaĐĐo CoŶtƌol͛, FCTC/COP3(12) (22 November 2008). 
44
 See, eg, The Queen v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food and Secretary of State for Health, ex parte: 
Fedesa and others (C-331/88) [1990] ECR I-4023, [13]. 
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extent to which plain packaging is appropriate to contribute to a high level of human health 
protection. In these circumstances, as illustrated below, the intensity of judicial review exercised by 
the EU courts is crucial in determining the outcome of the suitability inquiry.  
 
2   Necessity 
The second limb of the proportionality test is an inquiry into the necessity of the harmonised 
measure. Under settled case law, necessity means that the measure adopted through EU action must 
not go beyond what it is necessary to achieve its objective45. In practical terms, the necessity limb 
requires verification whether or not less restrictive measures to achieve the declared goal could 
exist. Provided that these alternative policy options exist, the legislator is bound to choose the least 
intrusive of all equally effective means in order not to undermine the Meŵďeƌ “tates͛ ƌegulatoƌǇ 
autonomy. 
 
The question is therefore whether plain packaging is necessary to achieve the internal market 
objective or whether this could be achieved by a less onerous method. If we assume that the trade 
barrier targeted by EU plain packaging is the adoption of national regimes in one or more Member 
States, it is difficult to imagine an alternative measure. However, this conclusion assumes that such 
national schemes would be legal under EU law. As illustrated in section VII, this remains an open 
question. 
 
3   Judicial Review of Proportionality 
The crucial issue in any proportionality analysis is the intensity of judicial review applied by the court. 
The EU judiciary is quite careful not to substitute its judgment for that of the EU legislature and tends 
to be quite deferential with respect to discretionary policy choices.46 It is settled case law that the EU 
legislatuƌe ͚ŵust ďe alloǁed a ďƌoad disĐƌetioŶ iŶ aŶ aƌea… ǁhiĐh eŶtails politiĐal, eĐoŶoŵiĐ aŶd 
social choices on its part, aŶd iŶ ǁhiĐh it is Đalled upoŶ to uŶdeƌtake Đoŵpleǆ assessŵeŶt.͛47 
Moƌeoǀeƌ, it is geŶeƌallǇ held that ͚ǁheƌe the CoŵŵuŶitǇ legislatuƌe is oďliged to assess the futuƌe 
effects of rules to be adopted and those effects cannot be accurately foreseen, its assessment is 
open to criticism only if it appears manifestly incorrect in the light of the information available to it at 
the tiŵe of the adoptioŶ of the ƌules iŶ ƋuestioŶ.͛ 48  The rationale for this application of 
proportionality, which is generally defined as ͚ŵaŶifest dispƌopoƌtioŶalitǇ͛, fiŶds its oƌigiŶ iŶ a ŵiǆ of 
concerns relating to legitimacy and expertise.49 Indeed, as illustrated by our previous analysis, very 
often the proportionality test turns on questions of evidence that lead the EU jurisdiction far from its 
aƌea of episteŵologiĐal ĐoŵpeteŶĐe. Hoǁeǀeƌ, ǁhile opeƌatiŶg ǁithiŶ a ͚ŵaŶifest dispƌopoƌtioŶalitǇ͛ 
test, EU Courts often engage with the contending arguments and, in so doing, may sometimes find 
an error warranting annulment. Given the uncertainty surrounding the judicial application of the 
principle, it is not easy to predict how the EU judiciary may review the proportionality of a 
hypothetical EU-wide plain packaging scheme. 
 
V   Trademark Regime 
                                                          
45 See, e.g., Case 137/85 Maizena [1987] ECR 4587, paragraph 15; Case C-339/92 ADM Ölmühlen [1993] ECR I-
6473, paragraph 15; and Case C-210/00 Käserei Champignon Hofmeister [2002] ECR I-6453, paragraph 59. 
46
 See Upjohn Ltd v The Licensing Authority established by the Medicines Act 1968 and Others (C-120/97) [1999] 
ECR 223, [34]. 
47
 See, to that effect, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v Council of the European Union  (C-
84/94) [1996] ECR I-5755, [58]; Federal Republic of Germany v European Parliament and Council of the 
European Union (C-233/94) [1997] ECR I-2405, [55]-[56]; The Queen v Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and 
Food, Commissioners of Customs & Excise, Ex Parte National Farmers' Union and Others (C-157/96) [1998] ECR 
I-2211, [61]. 
48
 Agrarproduktion Staebelow GmbH v Landrat des Landkreises Bad Doberan (C-504/04) [2006] ECR I-679, [38]; 
Jippes and Others v Minister van Landbouw, Natuurbeheer en Visserij (C-189/01) [2001] ECR I‑ 5689, [84]. 
49
 Paul Craig, EU Adminstrative Law (Oxford University Press, 2006) 668-9. 
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A further obstacle to the introduction of plain packaging is the EU trademark regime. Plain packaging 
entails the removal of all the design elements typically displayed on cigarette packs. The use of the 
characterising features of brand names (eg ͚Maƌlďoƌo͛, ͚Caŵel͛, etĐͿ ǁould also ďe ďaŶŶed fƌoŵ the 
pack: in particular the distinctive typeface, color and font size of tobacco signs would be replaced by 
a standard plain format. Tobacco manufacturers typically register all these signs as trademarks. 
Indeed, Article 2 of Directive 2008/9550 ;͚Tƌadeŵaƌk DiƌeĐtiǀe͛Ϳ pƌoǀides that ͚a tƌade ŵaƌk ŵaǇ 
consist of any signs capable of being represented graphically, particularly words, including personal 
names, designs, letters, numerals, the shape of goods or of their packaging, provided that such signs 
are capable of distinguishing the goods or services of one undertaking from those of other 
uŶdeƌtakiŶgs͛. 51  An analogous provision is contained in Article 4 of Regulation 207/2009 52 
;͚Tƌadeŵaƌk ‘egulatioŶ͛Ϳ. 
 
Given the likelihood that these EU trademark provisions would be invoked to oppose the 
introduction of this tobacco control measure, the following paragraphs analyse the compatibility of 
an EU-wide plain packaging scheme with EU trademark law.   
 
A   Does Plain Packaging Jeopardise the Main Function of Trademarks? 
Trademarks make it easier for the public to make educated purchase decisions. It is for this reason 
that, in order to be registrable, trademarks should effectively distinguish the goods or services of one 
company from those of other companies.53 This has been recognised by the EU courts as well as the 
deĐisioŶ pƌaĐtiĐe of the OffiĐe foƌ HaƌŵoŶizatioŶ iŶ the IŶteƌŶal Maƌket ;͚OHIM͛Ϳ.54 
 
This fundamental function may be threatened should trademarks not be visible, or even available, to 
consumers when selecting a product. This is exactly what plain packaging would create, as all of the 
distinctive elements displayed on the box would be removed. This new measure may therefore 
thƌeateŶ ĐoŶsuŵeƌs͛ aďilitǇ to ŵake ƌeasoŶed ĐhoiĐes, as theƌe ǁould ďe little diffeƌeŶĐe — besides 
the brand names — between the different cigarette boxes marketed by tobacco companies. 
 
The concerns related to the loss of distinctiveness appear heightened if examined in the light of ECJ 
findings made in proceedings involving the legality of the Tobacco Products Directive. In this case the 
ECJ ǁas Đalled upoŶ to eǆaŵiŶe the eǆteŶt to ǁhiĐh the pƌohiďitioŶ of desĐƌiptoƌs suĐh as ͚light͛, 
͚ultƌa-light͛, ͚loǁ-taƌ͛ aŶd ͚ŵild͛ Đould iŶfƌiŶge the fuŶdaŵeŶtal ƌight to pƌopeƌtǇ, iŶĐludiŶg 
intellectual property and trademark rights. After confirming that this provision prohibits the use of 
trademarks incorporating the above descriptors, the Court noted that tobacco producers may 
ĐoŶtiŶue usiŶg otheƌ distiŶĐtiǀe sigŶs oŶ the paĐks. IŶ paƌtiĐulaƌ, it held that ͚[ǁ]hile that article 
entails prohibition, in relation only to the packaging of tobacco products, on using a trade mark 
incorporating one of the descriptors referred to in that provision, the fact remains that a 
manufacturer of tobacco products may continue, notwithstanding the removal of that description 
                                                          
50
 Directive 2008/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2008 to Approximate the 
Laws of the Member States Relating To Trade Marks [1998] OJ L 299/25. 
51
 Emphasis added. The Trademark Directive codified the previous First Council Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 
December 1988 to Approximate the Laws of the Member States Relating to Trade Marks [1988] OJ L 40/1, 
which had been amended by Council Decision 92/10/EEC of 19 December 1991 Postponing the Date on which 
the National Provisions Applying Directive 89/104/EEC to Approximate the Laws of the Member States Relating 
to Trade Marks Are to be Put Into Effect [1992] OJ L 6/35. 
52
 Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 of 26 February 2009 on the Community Trade Mark [2009] OJ L 78/1. 
The Trademark Regulation codified the previous Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the 
Community Trade Mark [1994] OJ L 11/1, which had been amended several times. 
53
 See Trademark Directive Article 2, Recital 11; Trademark Regulation, Article 4. 
54
 See, eg, Arsenal Football Club plc v Reed (C-206/01) [2002] ECR I-10273, [47]. See also OHIM, Fourth Board of 
Appeal, November 19, 2008, Case No. R 804/2008-4 (with particular reference to three-dimensional 
trademarks). 
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fƌoŵ the paĐkagiŶg, to distiŶguish its pƌoduĐt ďǇ usiŶg otheƌ distiŶĐtiǀe sigŶs͛.55 According to an a 
contrario interpretation of this finding, it may seem that a measure that does not allow tobacco 
producers to use signs capable of distinguishing their products might negatively impact on the main 
function of their trademarks.56  
 
Yet the above finding could not be invoked to claim that plain packaging is not compliant with EU 
trademark law. The distinctiveness of a trademark is relevant when it comes to granting registration, 
with the result that signs devoid of distinctive character will not be protected.57 However, this does 
not mean that public law measures that have a negative impact on the distinctive character of 
already registered trademarks are necessarily contrary to EU law as there is no a general prohibition 
on restricting the use of distinctive elements under EU  law . 
 
B   Does Plain Packaging Infringe Trademark Rights? 
In order to determine if plain packaging is contrary to EU trademark law, it is necessary to investigate 
if and to what extent it encroaches upon the rights offered by trademark registration. Article 5 of the 
Trademark Directive and Article 9 of the Trademark Regulation, lay down the scope of protection 
given by a trademark registration. It is generally believed that these provisions do not offer their 
owners a positive right to use the protected sign, but a negative right to prevent third parties from 
using it.58 Indeed, the right to use a sign does not arise from registration at all, but from the freedom 
to carry out commercial activities in the market59. As a matter of fact any person interested in trading 
is free to start using trademarks for distinguishing his products and services, provided that such signs 
do not infringe upon earlier exclusive rights owned by third parties.   
 
This reading is disputed by some commentators, who consider it too formalistic: by permitting a right 
of registration but at the same time denying a right of use — it is argued — such an interpretation 
may annihilate the whole aim of registration, which is to offer owners a right of exclusive use.60 Yet 
the above disputed reading had been endorsed by Advocate General Geelhoed in his Opinion on the 
validity of the Tobacco Products Directive, where he stated that:  
 
[T]he essential substance of a trademark right does not consist in an entitlement as against the 
authorities to use a trademark unimpeded by provisions of public law. On the contrary, a trademark 
                                                          
55
 The Queen v Secretary of State for Health, ex parte British American Tobacco (Investments) Ltd and Imperial 
Tobacco Ltd (C-491/01) [2002] ECR I-11453, [152]. 
56
 “ee also Buƌkhaƌt Goeďel, ͚Tƌadeŵaƌks as FuŶdaŵeŶtal ‘ights—Euƌope͛ ;ϮϬϬ9Ϳ 99 Trademark Reporter 953. 
57
 See Trademark Directive Article 2; Trademark Regulation Article 4. 
58
 See Chapter 5 in this volume (analysing an analogous provision of TRIPS Agreement, Article 16). See also 
Jayashree Watal, Intellectual Property Rights in the WTO and Developing Countries (Kluwer, 2001) 291;  Carlos 
Correa, Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights: A Commentary on the TRIPS Agreement, (Oxford 
University Press, 2007) 182; Appellate Body Report, United States – Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 
1998, WTO Doc WT/DS176/AB/R (adopted 1 February 2002) [186]; Panel Report, European Communities – 
Protection of Trademarks and Geographical Indications for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, Complaint by 
Australia, WTO DoĐ WT/D“Ϯ9Ϭ/‘ ;adopted ϮϬ Apƌil ϮϬϬϱͿ [ϳ.ϲϲϰ] ;͚EC – Trademarks and Geographical 
Indications (Australia)͛Ϳ. 
59
 See AŶŶette Kuƌ, ͚The ‘ight to Use OŶe͛s OǁŶ Tƌade Maƌk: A “elf-Evident Issue or a New Concept in German, 
EuƌopeaŶ, aŶd IŶteƌŶatioŶal Tƌade Maƌk Laǁ?͛ ;ϭ99ϲͿ ϰ European Intellectual Property Review 198, 199. 
60
 See Patrick Basham and John C Luik, Erasing IntelleĐtual Property: ͚PlaiŶ PaĐkagiŶg͛ for CoŶsuŵer ProduĐts 
and the Implications for Trademark Rights (Democracy Institute Washington Legal Foundation, 2011) 22-29. 
See also Report by Daniel Gervais for Japan Tobacco International, Analysis of the Compatibility of certain 
Tobacco Product Packaging Rules with the TRIPS Agreement and the Paris Convention (30 November 2010) 11-
12; Kur, n 59, 203.  
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right is essentially a right enforceable against other individuals if they infringe the use made by the 
holder.61 
 
Following this interpretation, it would seem that plain packaging — which would be implemented by 
͚pƌoǀisioŶs of puďliĐ laǁ͛ — would not breach trademark rights as it does not authorise third parties 
to eǆploit toďaĐĐo sigŶs, ďut ŵeƌelǇ ĐoŶsists of a ƌestƌiĐtioŶ oŶ ƌight oǁŶeƌs͛ aďilitǇ to use theiƌ oǁŶ 
signs. Despite the loss of distinctiveness of tobacco trademarks, rights holders could still exercise the 
right to prohibit the misappropriation of their signs by unauthorised third parties.  
 
Thus, the fact that trademark rights are essentially negative rights under EU law should permit 
Member States to pursue and adopt public policies, such as measures aimed at protecting public 
health.62 The validity of this conclusion seems confirmed by the WTO Panel in the abovementioned 
EC – Trademarks and Geographical Indications (Australia) 63, a case between US and EU regarding the 
foƌŵeƌ͛s ĐoeǆisteŶĐe ƌegiŵe ďetǁeeŶ geographical indications and trademarks64. In that case, the 
PaŶel held that a ͚fuŶdaŵeŶtal featuƌe of iŶtelleĐtual pƌopeƌtǇ pƌoteĐtioŶ iŶheƌeŶtlǇ gƌaŶts Meŵďeƌs 
freedom to pursue legitimate public policy objectives since many measures to attain those public 
policy objectives lie outside the scope of intellectual property rights and do not require an exception 
uŶdeƌ the T‘IP“ AgƌeeŵeŶt͛.65  
 
VI   Fundamental Rights 
The enactment of an EU-wide plain packaging scheme may encounter further difficulties when 
examined in the light of the fundamental rights of the European Union. Under Article 6 of the Treaty 
of the the European Union (TEU)66, these rights flow on the one hand from the Charter of 
FuŶdaŵeŶtal ‘ights of the EU ;͚Chaƌteƌ͛Ϳ67, and on the other from the European Convention of 
HuŵaŶ ‘ights ;͚ECH‘͛Ϳ68 as well as the constitutional traditions common to the Member States. 
Under Article 52(3) of the Charter, the meaning and scope of Charter rights that correspond to ECHR 
rights are the same as those laid down in the ECHR. Although the EU is not directly bound by the 
ECHR, the ECJ recognizes, under settled case law, ECHR rights as general principles of EU law:69 a 
breach of these rights might thus amount to a violation of EU law.  The question is therefore whether 
plain packaging may encroach upon the fundamental freedom to pursue trade as well as the right of 
property, as enshrined in the Charter and the ECHR. 
 
The fundamental freedom to pursue trade is protected by Article 16 and the right to property by 
Article 17 of the Charter. Before being codified in the Charter, both rights were recognised as general 
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principles of EU law.70 Neither is an absolute right,71 but may be subject to restrictions that pursue 
objectives of general interest and that do not constitute, in relation to the aim pursued, a 
disproportionate interference that impairs the very substance of the right in question.72 
 
The limitations on the use of brands imposed by plain packaging would not impair the very substance 
of the right of the tobacco industry to pursue its trade. This is because such limitations would only 
have an impact on how the right is exercised, without putting at risk its existence.73 Even after the 
introduction of an EU-wide plain packaging regime, tobacco manufacturers would still be able to 
place their goods on the market. Moreover, in the absence of a positive right of use enshrined in 
their trademark rights, it is unlikely that the tobacco industry could successfully challenge plain 
packaging by claiming that it amounts to a breach of the right to property.  
 
VII   The Legality of National Plain Packaging Schemes under EU Law 
Our investigation has so far focused on whether an EU-wide plain packaging scheme would be 
compatible with EU law. To provide a full analysis, however, it is necessary to consider an 
increasingly likely scenario in which one or more of the Member States of the EU introduces its own 
national plain packaging scheme.  
 
A   Drivers Behind the Adoption of Plain Packaging at the National Level 
The drivers behind the enactment of plain packaging legislation at the national level are similar to 
those that might lead the EU to embrace plain packaging. Virtually all Member States are parties to 
the WHO FCTC74 and as such Article 11 and Article 13 and their Guidelines encourage them to 
develop effective restrictions on the labeling and advertising of cigarettes. In principle, in the 
absence of EU regulatory action, Member States are free to adopt plain packaging schemes within 
their own jurisdictions. However, the likely obstacles to the free movement of cigarette products 
that might stem from such schemes raise questions as to whether they would be compatible with EU 
law.  
 
B   Obstacles to the Free Movement of Tobacco Products 
AƌtiĐle ϯϰ of the TFEU pƌohiďits ƋuaŶtitatiǀe ƌestƌiĐtioŶs ǁithiŶ the EU aŶd applies to all ͚tƌadiŶg ƌules 
enacted by Member States, which are capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or 
potentially, intra-CoŵŵuŶitǇ tƌade͛.75 There is no doubt that plain packaging rules could constitute 
obstacles to the free movement of tobacco products. However, national schemes may nonetheless 
be justified under Article 36 of the TFEU on the grounds of protecting of public health. To justify a 
measure, the relevant Member State would need to prove that it: (i) falls within one of the grounds 
of justification covered by the first sentence of Article 36 (ie public health); (ii) is justified because it 
is necessary and appropriate to achieve that objective; (iii) does not constitute arbitrary 
discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between Member States. Thus, Member State 
action must pass a test of proportionality that is similar to the test applied to EU-wide measures. 
However, because of the potentially disruptive effect that national measures may have on the EU 
internal market, EU courts tend to engage in a more intensive review when determining whether 
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restrictive measures adopted by a Member State are necessary or warranted76. Moreover, unlike an 
EU-wide scheme, national plain packaging schemes would be examined solely in light of the objective 
of protecting public health under both the suitability and necessity tests. This is likely to lead the 
interpreter, be it the ECJ or a national court applying EU law, to engage in a closer analysis of the 
effectiveness of plain packaging in reducing tobacco consumption. 
 
Although the burden of proof bears on the acting Member State, who has to adduce evidence or 
data in support of the contested measure, the national authorities cannot – in principle – ͞ďe 
deprived of the possibility of establishing that an internal restrictive measure satisfies those 
requirements, solely on the ground that that Member State is not able to produce studies serving as 
the ďasis foƌ the adoptioŶ of the legislatioŶ at issue͟77. This would seem to suggest that, despite a 
more intrusive standard of judicial review, national measures may still survive, at least in principle, 
the pƌopoƌtioŶalitǇ sĐƌutiŶǇ eǀeŶ iŶ the aďseŶĐe of ͚haƌd͛ eǀideŶĐe iŶ theiƌ suppoƌt. The judgment 
delivered on September 12, 2011 by the EFTA Court, Philip Morris v Norway78, seems to confirm this 
conclusion79. In a request for an advisory opinion, the EFTA Court was asked to determine whether a 
general prohibition on the visible display of tobacco products, such as the total advertising ban in 
force in Norway since January 2010, could entail a measure having an equivalent effect to a 
quantitative restriction within the meaning of Article 11 of the European Economic Area (EEA) 
AgƌeeŵeŶt, ǁhose laŶguage esseŶtiallǇ oǀeƌlaps ǁith AƌtiĐle ϯϰ TFEU. The Couƌt held that ͞ďǇ its 
Ŷatuƌe͟ a ǀisual displaǇ ďaŶ of toďaĐĐo pƌoduĐts is Ŷot oŶlǇ liaďle to faǀouƌ domestic products over 
imported ones – as consumers tend to be more familiar with the former80 –, but also that such a 
discriminatory effect would be particularly significant with regard to market penetration of new 
products81. It then justified such a measure ďǇ judgiŶg that ͞ǀisual displaǇ ďaŶ is suitaďle foƌ the 
protection of public health as by its nature it seems likely to limit, at least in the long run, the 
ĐoŶsuŵptioŶ of toďaĐĐo pƌoduĐts͟82. Despite the fact that the ECJ is not formally bound by the EFTA 
Couƌt͛s Đase laǁ, the ƌeasoŶiŶg deǀeloped ďǇ the latteƌ iŶ Philip Morris v Norway might be followed, 
by analogy, by the ECJ when called upon to examine the legality of national plain packaging schemes 
under EU law83. 
 
C   The ͚UŶitaƌǇ EffeĐt͛ of CoŵŵuŶitǇ Trademarks 
Another area in which the introduction of plain packaging at the national level may give rise to 
concerns is trademark law. One of the main principles of EU trademark law is the so-Đalled ͚uŶitaƌǇ 
effeĐt͛ of the CoŵŵuŶitǇ Tƌadeŵaƌk, which is a unique title granted by the Office for the 
Harmonization in the Internal Market that is valid in all the twenty-seven EU Member States. 
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According to this principle, as enshrined in Article 1(2) of the Trademark Regulation,84 a Community 
Tƌadeŵaƌk has ͚aŶ eƋual effect throughout the Community: it shall not be registered, transferred or 
surrendered or be the subject of a decision revoking the rights of the proprietor or declaring it 
invalid, nor shall its use be prohibited, save in respect of the whole Community͛.85 In other words, the 
Community Trademark is a unique title that is valid in all 27 Member States, meaning that its use 
cannot be prohibited in individual countries. 
 
The introduction of plain packaging at a national level, by preventing the use of tobacco-related 
Community Trademarks in some Member States but not others, is likely to clash with the unitary 
character of the Community Trademark system. Although Article 22 of the Trademark Regulation 
provides for an exception to this principle by stating that a Community Trademark may be licenced 
for the whole or part of the Community, no exception to the principle of unitary effect would allow 
individual Member States to prohibit the use of Community Trademarks licensed for the EU as a 
whole. 
 
VIII   Conclusion 
The analysis above demonstrates that the road towards mandatory plain packaging of cigarettes 
within the EU faces several difficulties under EU law. This is especially the case for national schemes, 
which — in the absence of a proposal for an EU-wide plan — seem likely to be adopted. However, 
the mere likelihood that these schemes could be adopted may give the EU competence to adopt an 
EU-wide plain packaging scheme. Thus, regardless of whether plain packaging is considered as an 
͚iŶteƌŶal ŵaƌket eŶhaŶĐeƌ͛ oƌ as aŶ ͚aŶti-ŵisleadiŶg ŵaƌketiŶg tool͛, it is likelǇ that the EU Đould 
validly introduce a plain packaging scheme within the EU legal order. However, while the obstacles to 
trade that would stem from national plain packaging schemes may give the EU competence to act, 
any EU-wide scheme would still face legal hurdles.  
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